

THE WESTERN CAROLINIAN.

PUBLISHED WEEKLY—JOHN BEARD, JR., EDITOR & PROPRIETOR—ROWAN COUNTY, N. C.

Vol. XIV. No. 51.

SALISBURY...SATURDAY, MAY 24, 1834.

{ Whole Number 75

THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.

[Concluded from our last.]

The Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive judges, in the first instance, of the question whether the President has committed an impeachable offence. A majority of the Senate, whose interference with the preliminary question has, for the best of all reasons, been studiously excluded, anticipate the action of the House of Representatives, assume not only the function which belongs exclusively to that body, but convert themselves into accusers, witnesses, council, and judges, and prejudice the whole case. Thus presenting the appalling spectacle, in a free State, of judges going through a labored preparation for an impartial hearing and decision, by a previous *ex parte* investigation and sentence against the supposed offender.

There is no more settled axiom in that Government whence we derived the model of this part of our Constitution, than that "the Lords cannot impeach to themselves, nor join in the accusation, because they are judges." Independently of the general reasons on which this rule is founded, its propriety and importance are greatly increased by the nature of the impeaching power. The power of arraigning the high officers of Government before a tribunal whose sentence may expel them from their seats and brand them as infamous, is eminently a popular remedy—a remedy designed to be employed for the protection of private right and public liberty, against the abuses of injustice and the encroachments of arbitrary power. But the framers of the Constitution were also undoubtedly aware that this formidable instrument had been and might be abused; and that, from its very nature, an impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, whatever might be its result, would in most cases be accompanied by so much of dishonor and reproach, solicitude and suffering, as to make the power of preferring it one of the highest solemnity and importance.

It was due to both these considerations, that the impeaching power should be lodged in the hands of those who, from the mode of their election and the tenure of their offices, would most accurately express the popular will, and at the same time be most directly and speedily amenable to the People. The theory of these wise and benignant intentions is, in the present case, effectually defeated by the proceedings of the Senate. The members of that body represent, not the People, but the States; and though they are undoubtedly responsible to the States, yet, from their extended term of service, the effect of that responsibility, during the whole period of that term, must very much depend upon their own impressions of its obligatory force.—When a body thus constituted expresses, before hand, its opinion in a particular case, and thus indirectly invites a prosecution, it not only assumes a power intended, for wise reasons, to be confined to others, but it shields the latter from that exclusive and personal responsibility under which it was intended to be exercised, and reverses the whole scheme of that part of the Constitution.

Such would be some of the objections to this procedure, even if it were admitted that there is just ground for imputing to the President the offences charged in the resolution. But if, on the other hand, the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is no reason for charging them upon him, and shall therefore deem it improper to prefer an impeachment, then will the violation of privilege as it respects that House, of justice as it regards the President, and of the Constitution, as it relates to both, be only the more conspicuous and impressive.

The constitutional mode of procedure on an impeachment has not only been wholly disregarded, but some of the first principles of natural right and enlightened jurisprudence have been violated in the very form of the resolution. It carefully abstains from averring in which of "the late proceedings, in relation to the public revenue, the President has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws." It carefully abstains from specifying *what laws or what parts* of the Constitution have been violated. Why was not the certainty of the offence—"the nature and cause of the accusation"—set out in the manner required in the Constitution, before even the humblest individual, for the smallest crime, can be exposed to condemnation?

Such a specification was due to the accused, that he might direct his defence to the real points of attack; to the people, that they might clearly understand in what particulars their institutions have been violated; and to the truth and certainty of our public annals. As the record now stands, whilst the resolution plainly charges upon the President at least one act of usurpation in "the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue," and is so framed that those Senators who believed that one such act, and only one, had been committed, could assent to it; its language is yet broad enough to include several such acts; and so it may have been regarded by some of those who voted for it. But though the accusation is thus comprehensive in the censures it implies, there is no such certainty of time, place, or circumstance, as to exhibit the particular conclusion of fact or law which induced any one Senator to vote for it. And it may well have happened, that, whilst one Senator believed that some particular act embodied in the resolution was an arbitrary and unconstitutional assumption of power; others of the majority may have deemed that very act both constitutional and expedient—or, if not expedient, yet still within the pale of the Constitution.

And thus a majority of the Senators may have been enabled to concur in a vague and undefined accusation, that the President, in the course of "the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue," had violated the Constitution and laws; whilst, if a separate vote had been taken in respect to each particular act, included within the general terms, the accusers of the President might, on any such vote, have been found in the minority.

Still further to exemplify this feature of the proceeding, it is important to be remarked, that the resolution, as originally offered to the Senate, specified, with adequate precision, certain acts of the President, which it denounced as a violation of the Constitution and laws; and that it was not until the very close of the debate, and when, perhaps, it was apprehended that a majority might not sustain the specific accusation contained in it, that the resolution was so modified as to assume its present form. A more striking illustration of the soundness and necessity of the rules which forbid vague and indefinite generalities, and require a reasonable certainty in all judicial allegations, and a more glaring instance of the violation of those rules, has seldom been exhibited.

In this view of the resolution, it must certainly be regarded, not as a vindication of any particular provision of the law or the Constitution, but simply as an official rebuke or condemnatory sentence, too general and indefinite to be easily repelled, but yet sufficiently precise to bring into discredit the conduct and motives of the Executive. But whatever it may have been intended to accomplish, it is obvious that the vague, general, and abstract form of the resolution, is in perfect keeping with those other departures from first principles and settled improvements in jurisprudence, so properly the boast of free countries in modern times. And it is not too much to say, of the whole of these proceedings, that if they shall be approved and sustained by an intelligent people, there will that great contest with arbitrary power, which had established in statutes, in bills of rights, in sacred charters, and in constitutions of Government, the right of every citizen to a notice before trial, to a hearing before conviction, and to an impartial tribunal for deciding on the charge, have been waged in vain.

If the resolution had been left in its original form, it is not to be presumed that it could ever have received the assent of a majority of the Senate: for the acts therein specified as violations of the Constitution and laws were clearly within the limits of the Executive authority. They are the "dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the U. States in deposit with the Bank of the U. States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion; and appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done." But as no other specification was substituted, and as these were the "Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue," principally referred to in the course of the discussion, they will doubtless be generally regarded as the acts intended to be denounced as "an assumption of authority and power not conferred by the Constitution or laws, but in derogation of both." It is therefore due to the occasion, that a condensed summary of the views of the Executive, in respect to them, should be here exhibited.

By the Constitution, "the Executive power is vested in a President of the U. States." Among the duties imposed upon him, and which he is sworn to perform, is that of "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed." Being thus made responsible for the entire action of the Executive Department, it was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws—a power in its nature executive—should remain in his hands. It is, therefore, not only his right, but the Constitution makes it his duty, to "nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint," all "officers of the United States whose appointments are not in the Constitution otherwise provided for," with a proviso that the appointment of inferior officers may be vested in the President alone in the Courts of Justice, or in the Heads of Departments.

The Executive power vested in the Senate, is neither that of "nominating" nor "appointing." It is merely a check upon the Executive power of appointment. If individuals proposed for appointment by the President, are by them deemed incompetent or unworthy, they may withhold their consent, and the appointment cannot be made. They check the action of the Executive, but cannot, in relation to those very subjects, act themselves, nor direct him. Selections are still made by the President, and the negative given to the Senate, without diminishing his responsibility, furnishes an additional guarantee to the country that the subordinate executive, as well as the judicial offices, shall be filled with worthy and competent men.

The whole Executive power being vested in the President, who is responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence, that he should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the performance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this principle, the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is an original Executive power, is left unchecked by the Constitution in relation to all Executive officers, for whose conduct the President is responsible, while it is taken from him in relation to judicial officers, for whose acts he is not responsible. In the Government from which many of the fundamental principles of our system are derived, the Head of the Executive Department originally had power to appoint and remove at will all officers, Executive and Judicial. It was to take the Judges out of this general power of removal, and thus make them independent of the Executive, that the tenure of their offices was changed to good behaviour. Nor is it conceivable why they are placed, in our Constitution, upon a tenure different from that of all other officers appointed by the Executive, unless it be for the same purpose.

But if there were any just ground for doubt on the face of the Constitution, whether all Executive officers are removable at the will of the President, it is obviated by the contemporaneous construction of the instrument, and the uniform practice under it. The power of removal was a topic of solemn debate in the Congress of 1789, while organizing the administrative departments of the Government, and it was finally decided that the President de-

rived from the Constitution the power of removal, so far as it regards that department for whose acts he is responsible. Although the debate covered the whole ground, embracing the Treasury as well as all the other Executive Departments, it arose on a motion to strike out of the bill to establish a Department of Foreign Affairs, since called the Department of State, a clause declaring the Secretary "to be removable from office by the President of the United States." After that motion had been decided in the negative, it was perceived that these words did not convey the sense of the House of Representatives in relation to the true source of the power of removal. With the avowed object of preventing any future inference that this power was exercised by the President in virtue of a grant from Congress, when in fact that body considered it as derived from the Constitution, the words which had been the subject of debate were struck out, and in lieu thereof a clause was inserted in a provision concerning the Chief Clerk of the Department, which declared that "whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, the Chief Clerk should, during such vacancy, have charge of the papers of the office. This change having been made for the express purpose of declaring the sense of Congress, that the President derived the power of removal from the Constitution, the Act as it passed has always been considered as a full expression of the sense of the Legislature on this important part of the American Constitution.

Here then we have the concurrent authority of President Washington, of the Senate, and the House of Representatives, numbers of whom had taken an active part in the Convention which framed the Constitution, and in the State conventions which adopted it, that the President derived an unqualified power of removal from that instrument itself, which is "beyond the reach of Legislative authority." Upon this principle the Government has now been steadily administered for about forty-five years, during which there have been numerous removals made by the President or by his direction, embracing every grade of Executive officers, from the Heads of Departments to the messengers of Bureaus.

The Treasury Department, in the discussions of 1789, was considered on the same footing as the other Executive Departments, and in the Act establishing it, the precise words were incorporated, indicative of the sense of Congress, that the President derives his power to remove the Secretary, from the Constitution, which appear in the Act establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. An Assistant Secretary of the Treasury was created, and it was provided that he should take charge of the books and papers of the Department "whenever the Secretary shall be removed from office by the President of the United States." The Secretary of the Treasury being appointed by the President, and being considered as constitutionally removable by him, it appears never to have occurred to any one in the Congress of 1789, or since, until very recently, that he was other than an Executive officer, the mere instrument of the Chief Magistrate, and in the execution of the laws, subject, like all other Heads of Departments, to his supervision and control. No such idea as an officer of the Congress can be found in the Constitution, or appears to have suggested itself to those who organized the Government. There are officers of each House, the appointment of which is authorized by the Constitution, but all officers referred to in that instrument, as coming within the appointing power of the President, whether established thereby, or created by law, are "officers of the United States."

No joint power of appointment is given to the two Houses of Congress, nor is there any accountability to them as one body; but as soon as any officer is created by law, of whatever name or character,

the appointment of the person or persons to fill it, devolves, by the Constitution, upon the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless it be an inferior officer, and the appointment be vested by the law itself "in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the Heads of Departments."

But at the time of the organization of the Treasury Department, an incident occurred which distinctly evinces the unanimous concurrence of the first Congress in the principle that the Treasury Department is wholly executive in its character and responsibilities. A motion was made to strike out the provision of the bill making it the duty of the Secretary "to digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit," on the ground that it would give the Executive Department of the Government too much influence and power in Congress. The motion was not opposed on the ground that the Secretary was the officer of Congress, and responsible to that body, which would have been conclusive, if admitted, but on other grounds, which conceded his Executive character throughout.

The whole discussion evinces an unanimous concurrence in the principle that the Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an Executive officer, and the struggle of the minority was to restrict his power as such. From that time down to the present, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Treasurer, Register, Comptrollers, Auditors, and Clerks, who fill the offices of that department, have, in the practice of the Government, been considered and treated as at will all officers, Executive and Judicial. It was to the Judges out of this general power of removal, and thus make them independent of the Executive, that the tenure of their offices was changed to good behaviour. Nor is it conceivable why they are placed, in our Constitution, upon a tenure different from that of all other officers appointed in all the other Executive Departments.

The custody of the public property, under such regulations as may be prescribed by legislative authority, has always been considered an appropriate function of the Executive Department in this and all other Governments. In accordance with this principle, every species of property belonging to the United States, (excepting that which is in the use of the several co-ordinate departments of the Government, as means to aid them in performing their appropriate functions,) is in charge of officers appointed by the President, whether it be lands, or

buildings, or merchandise, or provisions, or clothing, or arms and munitions of war. The superintendents and keepers of the whale are appointed by the President, and removable at his will.

Public money is but a species of public property. It cannot be raised by taxation or customs, nor brought into the treasury in any other way, except by law; but whenever or however obtained, its custody always has been, and always must be, unless the Constitution be changed, intrusted to the Executive Department. No officer can be created by Congress for the purpose of taking charge of it, whose appointment would not, by the Constitution, at once devolve on the President, and who would not be responsible to him for the faithful performance of his duties. The legislative power may undoubtedly bring him and the President, by any law they may think proper to enact; they may prescribe in what places particular portions of the public money shall be kept, and for what reason it shall be removed, as they may direct that *such-and-such* a sum or more shall be kept in *such-and-such* a place; and it will be the duty of the President to see that the law is faithfully executed—yet will the custody remain in the Executive Department of the Government. They also show that transfers of the public deposits from the Branches of the Bank of the United States to state banks, at Chillicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in 1819, were made with the approbation of the President, and by his order.

They also show that the transfers of the public

money in any of the departments? They also show that, it was for the sake of the safety of the executive officers, from the risk of being faithlessly treated, that the law was made.

by law, that the Secretary of the Treasury has made him their chief Magistrate, and that the power of this Government is intrusted to him, implied in these questions appears to me to need elucidation.

But here, also, we have a construction of the construction of the Act, which shows that it was not understood as in any way changing the relations between the President and Secretary of the Treasury, or as placing the latter out of Executive control, even in relation to the deposites of the public money. Nor in this point are we left to any doubtful testimony. The documents of the Treasury Department show that the Secretary of the Treasury did apply to the President, and obtained his approbation and sanction to the original transfer of the public deposits to the present Bank of the United States, and did carry the measure into effect in accordance to his decision. They also show that transfers of the public deposits from the Branches of the Bank of the United States to state banks, at Chillicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in 1819, were made with the approbation of the President, and by his order.

These documents also show that the transfers of the public deposits from the Branches of the Bank of the United States to state banks, at Chillicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in 1819, were made with the approbation of the President, and by his order.

Thus was it settled by the Constitution, and the whole practice of the Government, that the entire executive power is in the President, and that the power, the right of appointing and removing all officers who are to aid him in the execution of the laws, with such restrictions only as the Constitution prescribes, is vested in the President; that the Secretary of the Treasury is one of those officers; that the custody of the public property and money is an Executive function, which, in relation to the money, has always been exercised through the Secretary of the Treasury and his subordinates; that in the performance of those duties, he is subject to the supervision and control of the President, and in all important measures having relation to them, consults the Chief Magistrate, and obtains his approval and sanction; that the law establishing the Bank did not, as it could not, change the relation between the President and the Secretary, and that the former was not faithfully executed, nor the latter from the President's supervision and control; that afterwards, and before, the Secretary did in fact consult, and obtain the sanction of the President, to transfers and removals of the public deposits, and that all departments of the Government, and the nation itself, approved or acquiesced in these acts and principles, as in strict conformity with our Constitution and laws.

During the last year, the approaching termina-

tion,

according to the provisions of its charter, and the solemn decision of the American people, of the Bank of the United States, made it expedient, and its exposed abuses and corruptions made it, in my opinion, the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, to place the money of the United States in other depositories. The Secretary did not concur in that opinion, and declined giving the necessary order and direction. So glaring were the abuses

and corruptions of the Bank, so evident its fixed purpose to persevere in them, and so palpable its design, by its money and power, to control the Government and change its character, that I deemed it the imperative duty of the Executive authority, by the exertion of every power conceded to it by the Constitution and laws, to check its career, and lessen its ability to do mischief; even in the painful alternative of dismissing the Head of one of the Departments. At the time the removal was made, other causes sufficient to justify it existed, but if they had not, the Secretary would have been dismissed for this cause only.

His place I supplied by one whose opinions were well known to me, and whose frank expression of them, in another situation, and whose sacrifices of interest and feeling, when unexpectedly called to the station he now occupies, ought forever to have shielded his motives from suspicion, and his character from reproach. In accordance with the opinions long before expressed by him, he presented, with my sanction, to make arrangements for depositing the monies of the United States in other safe institutions.

The resolution of the Senate, as originally framed, and as passed, if it refers to these acts, presupposes a right in that body to interfere with this exercise of Executive power.

If the principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to see where it may end. If, by a mere denunciation like this resolution, the President should ever be induced to act, in a matter of official duty, contrary to the honest convictions of his own mind, in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional independence of the Executive Department would be as effectually destroyed, and its power as effectually transferred to the Senate, as if that end had been accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution.

But if the Senate have a right to interfere with the Executive power, they have also the right to make the Executive powerless. If the Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, they will, under their own construction, be as effectually destroyed, and its power as effectually transferred to the Senate, as if that end had been accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

Senate may reduce, even to nothing, the Executive power, and will render it powerless.

and to confirm proper nominations made by the President: It has already been maintained (and it is not conceivable that the resolution of the Senate can be based on any other principle) that the Secretary of the Treasury is the officer of Congress, and independent of the President: that the President has no right to control him, and consequently none to remove him. With the same propriety, and on similar grounds, may the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of War, and the Navy, and the Postmaster General, each in succession, be declared independent of the President, the successors of Congress, and removable only with the concurrence of the Senate. Followed to its consequences, this principle will be found effectual to destroy one co-ordinate department of the Government, to concentrate in the hands of the Senate the whole Executive power, and to leave the President powerless as he would be useless in his office of authority, after the substance had departed.

The time and the occasions which have called for the resolution of the Senate, seem to impose upon us an additional obligation not to pass it over in silence. Nearly forty-five years had the President exercised, without a question as to his rightful authority, those powers for the assumption of which he is now denounced. The vicissitudes of peace and war had attended our Government; violent parties, watchful to take advantage of any seeming usurpation on the part of the Executive, had distrusted our counsels; frequent removals, or forced resignations, in every sense tantamount to removals, had been made of the Secretary and other officers of the Treasury; and yet, in no one instance is it known that any man, whether partisan or partisan, had raised his voice against it as a violation of the Constitution. The expediency and justice of such changes, in reference to public officers of all grades, have frequently been the topics of discussion; but the constitutional right of the President to appoint, control, and remove the head of the Treasury, as well as all other departments, seems to have been universally conceded. And what is the occasion upon which other principles have been first officially asserted? The Bank of the United States, a great money monopoly, had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter, by controlling the elections of the people and the action of the Government. The use of its corporate funds and powers, in that attempt, was fully disclosed: and it was made known to the President that the corporation was putting in train the same course of measures, with the view of making another vigorous effort, through an interference in the elections of the people, to control public opinion and force the Government to yield to its demands. This, with its corruption of the press, its violation of its charter, its exclusion of the Government Directors from its proceedings, its neglect of duty, and arrogant pretensions, made it, in the opinion of the President, incompatible with the public interest and safety of our institutions, that it should be longer employed as the fiscal agent of the Treasury. A Secretary of the Treasury, appointed in the recess of the Senate, who had not been confirmed by that body, and whom the President might or might not, at his pleasure, nominate to them, refused to do what his superior in the Executive Department considered the most imperative of his duties, and became in fact, however innocent his motive, the protector of the Bank. And on this occasion it is discovered, for the first time, that those who framed the Constitution misunderstood it; that the first Congress and all its successors have been under a delusion; that the practice of that the Secretary of the Treasury is not responsible to the President; and that to remove him is a violation of the Constitution and laws, for which the President deserves to stand forever dishonored on the Journals of the Senate.

There are also some other circumstances connected with the discussion and passage of the resolution, to which I feel it to be not only my right, but my duty, to refer. It appears, by the Journals of the Senate, that among the twenty-six Senators who voted for the resolution on its final passage, and who had supported it in debate, in its original form, were one of the Senators from the State of Maine, the two Senators from New Jersey, and one of the Senators from Ohio. It also appears, by the same journal, and the files of the Senate, that the Legislatures of these States had severally expressed their opinions in respect to the Executive proceedings drawn in question before the Senate.

The two branches of the Legislature of the State of Maine, on the 25th of January, 1834, passed a preamble and a series of resolutions in the following words:

"Whereas, at an early period after the election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, in accordance with the sentiments which he had uniformly expressed, the attention of Congress was called to the constitutionality and expediency of the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank: And whereas, the Bank has transcended its chartered limits in the management of its business transactions, and has abandoned the object of its creation, by engaging in political controversies, by wielding its power and influence to embarrass the administration of the General Government, and by bringing insolvency and distress upon the commercial community: And whereas, the public security from such an institution consists less in its present pecuniary capacity to discharge its liabilities, than in the fidelity with which the trusts reposed in it have been executed: And whereas, the abuse and misapplication of the power conferred, have destroyed the confidence of the public in the officers of the Bank, and demonstrated that such power endangers the stability of republican institutions: Therefore,

"Resolved, That in the removal of the Public Deposits from the Bank of the United States, as well as in the manner of their removal, we recognize in the administration an adherence to constitutional rights, and the performance of a public duty.

"Resolved, That this Legislature entertain the same opinion as heretofore expressed by preceding Legislatures of this State, that the Bank of the United States ought not to be re-chartered.

"Resolved, That the Senators of this State in the Congress of the United States be instructed, and the Representatives be requested, to oppose the restoration of the Deposits to, and the renewal of the charter of, the United States Bank."

On the 11th of January, 1834, the House of Assembly and Council composing the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, passed a "preamble and a series of resolutions in the following words:

"Whereas, the present crisis in our public affairs calls for a decided expression of the voice of the people of this State: And whereas, we consider it the unalienable right of the Legislatures of the several States to instruct those who represent their interests in the councils of the nation, in all matters which concern the public welfare, and especially the welfare and well-being of the people: Therefore,

with feelings of devout gratitude, our obligations to the great Ruler of nations for his mercies to us as a people, that we have been preserved alike from foreign war, from the evils of internal commotions, and the machinations of designing and ambitious men, who would prostrate the fair fabric of our Union; that we ought, nevertheless, to humble ourselves in His presence, and implore His aid for the perpetuation of our republican institutions, and for a continuance of that unequalled prosperity which our country has hitherto enjoyed.

"2. Resolved, That we have undiminished confidence in the integrity and firmness of the venerable patriot who now holds the distinguished post of Chief Magistrate of this nation, and whose purity of purpose and elevated motives have so often received the qualified approbation of a large portion of his fellow-citizens.

"3. Resolved, That we view with agitation and alarm the existence of a great money incorporation, which threatens to embarrass the operations of the Government, and by means of its unbounded influence upon the currency of the country, to scatter distress and ruin throughout the community; and that we, therefore, solemnly believe the present Bank of the U. States ought not to be re-chartered.

"4. Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our members of the House of Representatives be requested, to sustain, by their votes and influence, the course adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Taney, in relation to the Bank of the United States and the deposits of the Government money, believing, as we do, the course of the Secretary to have been constitutional, and that the public good required its adoption.

"5. Resolved, That the Governor be requested to forward a copy of the above resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives from this State in the Congress of the United States.

On the 21st day of February last, the Legislature of the same State reiterated the opinions and instructions before given, by joint resolutions, in the following words:

"Resolved, by the Council and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, That they do adhere to the resolutions passed by them on the 11th day of January last, relative to the President of the U. States, the Bank of the United States, and the course of Mr. Taney, in removing the Government deposits.

"Resolved, That the Legislature of New Jersey have not seen any reason to depart from such resolutions since the passage thereof; and it is their wish that they should receive from our Senators and Representatives in the Congress of the United States, that department, would hold out the strongest temptation to resistance on the part of the State sovereignties, whenever they shall suppose their just rights to have been invaded? Thus all the independent departments of the Government, and the States which compose our confederated Union, instead of attending to their appropriate duties, and leaving those who may offend, to be reclaimed or punished in the manner pointed out in the Constitution, would fall to mutual crimination and recrimination, and give to the people confusion and anarchy, instead of order and law; until at length some form of aristocratic power would be established on the ruins of the Constitution, or the States be broken into separate communities.

Far be it from me to charge or insinuate that the present Senate of the United States intend, in the most distant way, to encourage such a result. It is not of their motives or designs, but only of the tendency of their acts, that it is my duty to speak. It is, if possible, to make Senators themselves sensible of the danger which lurks under the precedent set in their resolution; and at any rate to perform my duty, as the responsible Head of one of the co-equal departments of the Government, that I have been compelled to point out the consequences to which the discussion and passage of the resolution may lead, if the tendency of the measure be not checked in its inception.

It is due to the high trust with which I have been charged; to those who may be called to succeed me in it; to the representatives of the people, whose constitutional prerogative has been unlawfully assumed; to the people and to the States; and to the Constitution they have established; that I should not permit its provisions to be broken down by such an attack on the Executive Department, without at least some effort "to preserve, protect, and defend," them. With this view, and with the reasons which have been stated, I do hereby solemnly PROTEST against the aforementioned proceedings of the Senate, as unauthorized by the Constitution; contrary to its spirit and to several of its express provisions; subversive of that distribution of the powers of the Government which it has ordained and established; destructive to the checks and safeguards by which those powers were intended, on the one hand, to be controlled, and on the other hand to be protected; and calculated, by their immediate and collateral effects, by their character and tendency, to concentrate in the hand of a body not directly amenable to the people, a degree of influence and power dangerous to their liberties, and fatal to the Constitution of their choice.

The resolution of the Senate contains an imputation upon my private as well as upon my public character; and as it must stand forever on their journals, I cannot close this substitute for that defense which I have not been allowed to present in the ordinary form, without remarking, that I have lived in vain, if it be necessary to enter into a formal vindication of my character and purposes from such an imputation. In vain do I bear upon my person enduring memorials of that contest in which American liberty was purchased—in vain have I since periled property, fame, and life, in defense of the rights and privileges so dearly bought—in vain am I now, without a personal aspiration, or the hope of individual advantage, encountering responsibilities and dangers, from which, by mere inactivity in relation to a single point, I might have been exempt—if any serious doubt can be entertained as to the purity of my purposes and motives. If I had been ambitious, I should have sought an alliance with that powerful institution, which even now aspires to no divided empire. If I had been venal, I should have sold myself to its designs—had I preferred personal comfort and official ease to the performance of my arduous duty, I should have ceased to molest it. In the history of conquerors and usurpers, never, in the fire of youth, nor in the vigor of manhood, could I find an attraction to lure me from the path of duty; and now, I shall scarcely find an inducement to commence the career of ambition, when gray hairs and a decaying frame, instead of inviting to toil and battle, call me to the contemplation of other worlds, where conquerors cease to be honored, and usurpers expire their crimes.

The only ambition I can feel, is to acquit myself to Him to whom I must soon render an account of my stewardship, to serve my fellow-men, and live respected and honored in the history of my country. No; the ambition which leads me on, is an anxious desire and a fixed determination to return to the people, unimpaired, the sacred trust they have confided to my charge—to heal the wounds of the Constitution, and preserve it from further violation; to persuade my countrymen, so far as I

or of arraigning and censuring the official conduct of the Executive, in the manner recently pursued. Such proceedings are eminently calculated to unsettle the foundations of the Government; to disturb the harmonious action of its different departments; and to break down the checks and balances by which the wisdom of its framers sought to ensure its stability and usefulness.

The honest differences of opinion which occasionally exist between the Senate and the President, in regard to matters in which both are obliged to participate, are sufficiently embarrassing—but if the course recently adopted by the Senate shall hereafter be frequently pursued, it is not only obvious that the harmony of the relations between the President and the Senate will be destroyed, but that other and graver effects will ultimately ensue. If the censures of the Senate be submitted to by the President, the confidence of the people in his ability and virtue, and the character and usefulness of his administration, will soon be at an end, and the real power of the Government will fall into the hands of a body holding their offices for long terms, not elected by the People, and not to them directly responsible. If, on the other hand, the illegal censures of the Senate should be resisted by the President, collisions and angry controversies might ensue, discreditable in their progress, and in the end compelling the people to adopt the conclusion, either that their Chief Magistrate was unworthy of their respect, or that the Senate was chargeable with calumny and injustice. Either of these results would impair public confidence in the perfection of the system, and lead to serious alterations of its frame work, or to the practical abandonment of some of its provisions.

The influence of such proceedings on the other Departments of the Government, and more especially on the States, could not fail to be extensively pernicious. When the judges in the last resort of official conduct, themselves overstep the bounds of their authority, as prescribed by the Constitution, what general disregard of its provisions might not their example be expected to produce? And who does not perceive that such contempt of the Federal Constitution, by one of its most important departments, would hold out the strongest temptation to resistance on the part of the State sovereignties, whenever they shall suppose their just rights to have been invaded?

With the scarcity of corn, the "removal of the deposits," and the removal of their patrons, this is going to be a hard season, we fear, upon Editors in North Carolina.

AndREW JACKSON.

April 15, 1834.

THE WESTERN CAROLINIAN.

SALISBURY SATURDAY MAY 24, 1834.

0—What with the scarcity of corn, the "removal of the deposits," and the removal of their patrons, this is going to be a hard season, we fear, upon Editors in North Carolina.

We have already heard the complaints of some of our brethren; and, as "misery loves company," we can tell them that we too have lately received a few very pitiful epistles from Postmasters, informing us that our subscribers, Mr. Sneak and Mr. Sly, have "moved off, and you had best stop their papers." And the worst of it is, these tidings are received without the consolatory accompaniment of the *needfu*.

We would not have it thought that we are lamenting the loss of so many honorable and useful citizens on our own account. It is for the State we grieve!—For Editors have no more right to complain of the derelictions of their patrons, than the poor mechanics of borrowed capital have to blame the removal of the deposites for their disasters. "Let these borrowers break!" says the President. And, Let these Editors live upon *type* and *printers' ink*! may our liberal runaway subscribers.

No class of white men in society are so emphatically the servants of the "Sovereign People," as Editors of newspapers. They have to labor for all sorts of people, and put up with every kind of neglect and abuse. A great many subscribers seem to think that there is no reciprocal obligation between themselves and Editors; and it frequently happens that those who are the hardest to please are the slowest to pay.

Suppose the whole fraternity of Editors throughout the Union should, upon a signal which might easily be given by the numerous Heralds, Telegraphs, &c., suddenly cease from their labors. Only think what an awful eclipse would cover the land! It would be worse than a drought in July: for it would derange the whole economy of the nation. We do not advocate the immediate adoption of this extreme measure, but merely alude to it as a thing that is practicable in order to open the eyes of the blind to their dependence upon us manufacturers of moral light.

For the present we will content ourselves with a simple PROTEST, (as protests are the fashion of the day,)—fully determined, however, that, if every other means should fail to bring us the necessary supplies, we will then resort to the *ultima ratio* of Editorial sovereignty, by withholding supplies from our *patrons*.

EMIGRATION.

Heretofore the tide of emigration from this State to the west and the southwest has been periodical, but now it has become constant, and flows with continually increasing magnitude.

This is probably owing to the extreme scarcity of grain, which causes a great many to break off before the Fall, the usual season for moving.

There was, some years ago, in this county, a newly-married couple, the better half of which was remarkably fond of sugar, and considered *store-keeping* as the *plus ultra* of human respectability and happiness.—She said, one day, she wished there was no body in the State but her and Davy, (her husband;) they would then *keep store and eat sugar*. Despairing of realizing the wish here, they went to Tennessee, allured by the hopes that, if they could not keep store there, they might *any how* get plenty of maple sugar. We have understood that they have not yet reached the grand aim of their sublunar bliss; but if they live a little longer, and things continue to go on here as they now do, the pair may find in North Carolina a clear field for *store-keeping*, without any opposition.

But really this is subject to joke about. Our poor old State, this *unpretending* State, is undergoing a depiction which, unless checked, will prove fatal to the body politic.

We do conscientiously believe that there is but one course of treatment that can be relied on for her restoration, and that is, in the first place, an *alternative*. We must begin by effecting a radical change in the Constitution. We must next prosecute an enlightened system of Internal Improvement. And last, though not least, we must establish schools throughout the State.

These three great objects of State policy are not measured in the order of their comparative importance, but in the order in which we think they must, if at all, be accomplished. As far as practicable, we are willing to see them going forward *peri passu*; but it seems to us it would be best to begin "at the stump," clear the way, and take a fair start without the impediments of our present Constitution.

If the People of North Carolina were all instructed sufficiently to see their own true interest, they would amend the Constitution; they would have greater facilities for getting their produce to market; and they would have schools in abundance for educating their children. Are there not enough enlightened men in the State to guide those who are less favored by circumstances? To answer in the negative, would be unjust aspersions upon the intelligence of the State.

Let all, then, who know how to appreciate the advantages of education, and of convenient channels of trade, unite in an energetic and persevering effort, and we shall soon see the whole aspect of our State changed from that of poverty and distress, into abundance, cheerfulness, and contentment.

By a wise change in the Constitution, a considerable sum of money may be saved annually, to apply to works of internal improvement. Then, by diminishing the cost of transportation, will stimulate the agriculturists to increased exertions, enhance the value of all kinds of property, add to individual and to public wealth, and of course furnish abundant means of sending schools throughout the community.

They cannot be too soon commenced, or prosecuted with too much vigor. Our resources are constantly flowing away, and each revolving year leaves us poorer than its predecessor. Our population is at this time more depressed, probably, than any other in the United States, and more so than they have ever been before. The whole State seems depopulated—deprived, not only of excitement, but almost of all excitability. Men of enterprise and energy are everywhere beginning to despair: constantly some are emigrating—and, if the process continues a few years longer, the prolific olive will be left to the entire possession of a race of miserable drones.

MORE JACKSON ECONOMY.

In the Appropriation Bill which has just passed the House of Representatives, there is one item of \$11,344 31 to pay for extra clerk hire for the last year in the Post-Office Department!

In a very able speech in opposition to this appropriation, Mr. Hardin, of Kentucky, paid the highest compliments to the talents and integrity of Major Barry, the Postmaster-General, and ascribed the disorder of the department to the knavery of those who have been placed about him by the system of "rewards and punishments." It is hard, though, to reconcile this with some facts stated by Mr. Hardin.—For instance: he stated that a Mr. Meriwether, who receives \$800 per year as a clerk in the Post-Office Department, had been engaged the whole session in taking down the debates in the House of Representatives, for the benefit of the "Globe," the Jackson newspaper at Washington, "until shame for the disclosures concerning that Department drove him from his seat." Is it possible that such things are tolerated by that pure Administration which has shaken the whole fabric of our Government by its persecutions of the Bank for expending the money of the stockholders in defence of their property and their rights?

(C) Memorials on the subject of the Currency, and of the pecuniary embarrassments of the country, continue to flow into Congress.

Upon presenting one from New York, on the 5th instant, Mr. Selden made a short but very able speech on the currency, and concluded by moving that "a Committee, consisting of one member from each State, be appointed to consider and report, in form of a bill, a plan for a safe and uniform currency, under authority of the United States."

Mr. Brown, of New York, moved to lay the memorial and resolution on the table.

On this question the ayes and nays being called, there was a tie—89 voting for, and 89 against, the motion.—The Speaker gave the casting vote to lay on the table.

This vote affords a glimmering of hope that something may yet be done to relieve public distress. The Administration party, like their chief, are pretty stiff-necked, but, we trust, they will ultimately be made to back out.

FOREIGN NEWS.

The French Chamber of Deputies lately refused to pass a bill making an appropriation for settling the American claims. But it appears, by the latest accounts, that the refusal produced a great excitement among the Liberals, and that the King and the Ministry exerted themselves in favor of the appropriation. It is confidently believed that the claims will be paid in the course of next year.

There has been a change in the French Ministry; all the old members of the Cabinet are dismissed, with the exception of Marshal Soult, President of the Council, and Minister of War; M. Hunmann, Minister of Finance; and E. Guizot, Minister of Public Instruction.

Hearing that the Government of Spain intended to send an army into Portugal to assist Don Pepeo in the expulsion of his brother, the Courts of Prussia and Austria addressed the Cabinets of London and Paris, protesting against the project of Spain, and threatening to send an army into Switzerland if Spain should persist in her design.

England and France, who have been long, but improperly considered, natural enemies, are now on the most friendly terms. Their Governments, though Monarchical, are too free and liberal for the safety and repose of their despotic neighbors, who consequently look upon them with jealousy, lest their liberal principles may spread over Europe. They approve the design of Spain; and, if it should be executed, and Prussia and Austria should follow up their "PROTEST" with the threatened invasion of Switzerland, it is more than probable a continental war will ensue.

A renewal of hostilities likewise expected between Holland and Belgium. This, if it do take place, will in all probability produce war with England and France on the one side, and the Emperor of Russia on the other.

From the N. Y. Courier and Enquirer.

In our article, on Wednesday, on the present position of affairs in France, we were compelled, by want of room, to omit all notice of a remarkable measure of oppression recently carried through the Legislative body by the Government, and which is not one of the least important amongst the events of the day. We allude to the law against Associations, which is particularly aimed at the Republican party. By the laws enacted under Napoleon, no assemblage exceeding twenty persons in number was permitted. The Republican party have evaded

North-Carolina State LOTTERY, FOR THE BENEFIT OF Salisbury Academy.

High and Low System.

to be Drawn in Salisbury,
On the 10th day of July.

Cash, \$3,000!

SCHEMES:	
1 Prize of \$3,000 is	3,000
5 " of 1,000 is	5,000
4 " of 500 is	2,000
5 " of 300 is	1,500
10 " of 200 is	2,000
50 " of 100 is	5,000
60 " of 50 is	3,000
100 " of 20 is	2,000
250 " of 10 is	2,500
20,000 " of 4 70 is	94,000
20,485 Prizes, amounting to	\$120,000

More Prizes than Blanks!

Whole Tickets.....	24
Halves.....	2
Quarters.....	1

Mode of Drawing:

This Scheme, founded on the High and Low System, has 40,000 Tickets, numbered from 1 to 40,000, inclusive. On the day of drawing, the 40,000 numbers will be put into one wheel, and all the prizes above the denomination of \$4 70 in *any* other : they will be drawn out alternately, first a number and then a prize, until all the prizes are drawn. From 1 to 20,000, inclusive, are low; and from 20,001 to 40,000, inclusive, are high. The prizes of \$4 70 to be awarded to the high or low division, will be determined by that which may now the capital prize of \$3,000. The prizes of \$4 70 will be payable in tickets in the next scheme—all other prizes payable in cash forty days after the drawing. All prizes subject to a deduction of fifteen per centum.

Tickets, Shares, and Packages, to be had, in the greatest variety of numbers, at

Stevenson & Points' Office,
(White Row, Mansion Hotel),
—SALISBURY.—

All orders from a distance, (post paid) enclosing the Cash, will be thankfully received and promptly attended to, if addressed to
STEVENSON & POINTS,
Managers, Salisbury, N.C.
May 17, 1834.

State of North Carolina :
MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions,
APRIL TERM, 1834.

William Butler, Executor of Joshua
Butler, dec'd., and others,

vs.

Jesse Moody, Catharine his wife,
Martin A. Poor, Laura M. Poor,
Susannah Poor, William Poor,
John Poor, William Sugg, Elizabeth
his wife, and Joshua Cochran,

Joshua Butler.

IT appearing, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the above named Defendants are not inhabitants of this State: It is therefore Ordered, by the Court, that publication be made, in the Western Carolinian, for six weeks, for them to appear at the next Term of this Court, to be held for the County of Montgomery, at the Courthouse in Lawrenceville, on the first Monday in July, 1834, and make themselves parties to these proceedings, or the same will be heard ex parte as to them.

Test:
JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,
His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about

One Thousand Acres
Of Real Good Farming Land,

On which is a fine
Brick Building,
constructed of the best ma-
terials, in the taste, and good workmanship.—Al-
so, all convenient Out-Houses, COTTON AND
THRESHING MACHINES, Barns, Stables, &c.

—ALSO—
Another Tract of Land,
lying on both sides of Dismal Creek, contain-
ing about

Eight Hundred Acres,
ALL FIRST RATE FOR ANY PURPOSES.

The above Property will be sold on a credit
of one, two, and three years.

In my absence, application may be made to my
brother, J. R. Hender-

DANIEL M. FORNEY.

Concord, May 17, 1834.

DOCTORS { L. MITCHELL,
AND
R. M. BOUCHELLE,
HAVE entered into Co-Partnership in the practice of their Profession. Their Office is kept in the house heretofore occupied by Dr. Mitchell, opposite to Mr. Slaughter's Hotel,
Salisbury, May 17, 1834. 3

3 A CARD.

DR. MITCHELL is anxious to close his former accounts, and respectfully requests those persons indebted to him to call at the Office of Mitchell & Bouchelle, and settle, by note or otherwise.

Salisbury, May 17, 1834. 3

Estate Sale.

On Tuesday, the 17th day of June next,
I WILL SELL,

At the late residence of Gen. Peter Forney, dec'd.,

All the Personal Property,
NOT OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF,

CONSISTING OF

A variety of FARMING and Mechanical Tools;

Horses, Mules, Cattle, and Oxen;

a quantity of Cast HOLLOWWARE—together with Pig-Iron Banding, and a variety of OLD IRON and METAL.

ALSO—

About Fifty Negroes,

Men, Women, and Children—among which are first-rate Hammerers, Refiners, Bloomers, Forge-carpenters, Blacksmiths, &c.

The sale will continue from day to day until the whole is disposed of.

Conditions: Twelve months' credit—bond and approved security required.

J. FORNEY, Executor.

Lincoln County, May 10, 1834. 4

NOTICE.

THE undersigned has this day qualified as Executor of the last Will and Testament of Anderson Ellis, deceased, and hereby requests all persons having claims against said Estate, to present them for payment within the time prescribed by Law; and all those indebted are hereby requested to make payment.

JAMES ELLIS, Executor.

November 23, 1833. 4

SELLING OFF At Cost!

S. LEMLY & SON,
HAVING DETERMINED to CLOSE THEIR BU-
SINESS IN THIS PLACE,

With the view of removing to the State of Missis-
sippi early in the ensuing Fall; beg leave to
inform the Public generally that they

Have Concluded to Sell off
THEIR STOCK OF GOODS,
CONSISTING OF

DRY-GOODS, HARD-WARE,
CUTLERY, CROCKERY,
AND

ALL other ARTICLES
generally kept on hand by
Merchants in this part of the country,

At Cost, for Cash!

Their Stock is Large, Complete, and New,
the whole having been purchased within the last
twelve months.

They respectfully invite their friends and
customers, as well as the public in general, to call
and examine the goods, as they are determined to
give bargains such as they feel confident will give
satisfaction to all who wish to purchase.

Salisbury, March 15, 1834.—4

JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,

His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about

One Thousand Acres
Of Real Good Farming Land,

On which is a fine
Brick Building,
constructed of the best ma-
terials, in the taste, and good workmanship.—Al-
so, all convenient Out-Houses, COTTON AND
THRESHING MACHINES, Barns, Stables, &c.

—ALSO—

Another Tract of Land,
lying on both sides of Dismal Creek, contain-
ing about

Eight Hundred Acres,
ALL FIRST RATE FOR ANY PURPOSES.

The above Property will be sold on a credit
of one, two, and three years.

In my absence, application may be made to my
brother, J. R. Hender-

DANIEL M. FORNEY.

Concord, May 17, 1834.

JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,

His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about

One Thousand Acres
Of Real Good Farming Land,

On which is a fine
Brick Building,
constructed of the best ma-
terials, in the taste, and good workmanship.—Al-
so, all convenient Out-Houses, COTTON AND
THRESHING MACHINES, Barns, Stables, &c.

—ALSO—

Another Tract of Land,
lying on both sides of Dismal Creek, contain-
ing about

Eight Hundred Acres,
ALL FIRST RATE FOR ANY PURPOSES.

The above Property will be sold on a credit
of one, two, and three years.

In my absence, application may be made to my
brother, J. R. Hender-

DANIEL M. FORNEY.

Concord, May 17, 1834.

JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,

His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about

One Thousand Acres
Of Real Good Farming Land,

On which is a fine
Brick Building,
constructed of the best ma-
terials, in the taste, and good workmanship.—Al-
so, all convenient Out-Houses, COTTON AND
THRESHING MACHINES, Barns, Stables, &c.

—ALSO—

Another Tract of Land,
lying on both sides of Dismal Creek, contain-
ing about

Eight Hundred Acres,
ALL FIRST RATE FOR ANY PURPOSES.

The above Property will be sold on a credit
of one, two, and three years.

In my absence, application may be made to my
brother, J. R. Hender-

DANIEL M. FORNEY.

Concord, May 17, 1834.

JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,

His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about

One Thousand Acres
Of Real Good Farming Land,

On which is a fine
Brick Building,
constructed of the best ma-
terials, in the taste, and good workmanship.—Al-
so, all convenient Out-Houses, COTTON AND
THRESHING MACHINES, Barns, Stables, &c.

—ALSO—

Another Tract of Land,
lying on both sides of Dismal Creek, contain-
ing about

Eight Hundred Acres,
ALL FIRST RATE FOR ANY PURPOSES.

The above Property will be sold on a credit
of one, two, and three years.

In my absence, application may be made to my
brother, J. R. Hender-

DANIEL M. FORNEY.

Concord, May 17, 1834.

JOHN B. MARTIN, Clerk.

May 17, 1834.

Valuable Real Property,
IN LINCOLN COUNTY,
FOR SALE.

The Subscriber, intending to remove to Alabama,
OFFERS FOR SALE,

His Residence in Lincoln Co.

Including, in one body, about